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ABSTRACT 
The current thesis concentrates on two aspects of the idea of creating EU Common Armed 
Forces/European army. The first part of the thesis clarifies the necessity of having its own 
credible military capabilities within the EU. Also in general terms it provides an overview 
of classical and modern armed forces created in the framework of international 
organisations. In addition, an overview of the progress made in the EU on this field and 
an assessment based on different authors is given.   
The second part of the thesis covers the description of procedure and outcomes of the 
conducted quantitative documents survey. The survey was designed on publicly available 
internet based database Eur Lex, which includes unclassified documents created by 
different EU institutions. The main outcome of the survey is that ongoing crises in 
Ukraine and refugee crises have not significantly affected the dynamics and content of 
created documents. Despite the temporary raise of the number of documents concerning 
the Ukraine crises, no evidence was found indicating the increase of interest from the EU 
supranational institutions of deepening EU military cooperation in the framework of 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).  
From the thesis it can be concluded that it is not likely that in the near future there will be 
any significant progress made towards creation of common armed forces/European army. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (EU) has been from the birth of the European Coal and Steel 
Community in the early 1950´s, a unique international project attracting many scholars 
and scientists to study its developments and possible future perspectives. From the initial 
fragmented forms of cross-border (economic) cooperation, Europe has turned to the 
complicated organization with its supranational institution. It is a paradox that at the time 
of the domination of the idea of National Republics and the rally of remarkably big ethnic 
groups like basks, kurds etc. towards their independence, a significant number of States 
in Europe has decided to give up domains which are traditionally considered to be in 
States’ sovereignty (Ojanen 2006: 58-60).1 Monetary policy; partial European laws 
superiority over National laws; laws and regulations made by the European Parliament 
and the European Commission and which are mandatory to be followed by the Member 
States are just some samples of it. One may ask, whether there is a limit and if 
continuation of this process leads to the creation of the European Federation with its 
institutions and components common to the federal state. 
The current thesis narrows this questions down and focuses on the possibility of the 
creation of European Common Armed Forces/European Army as a permanent EU 
military force in the frameworks of EU as the next step in the federalization process. 
Classically the States are keeping the monopoly over the legitimate use of (military) force 
(Cross 2007: 80).2 Worldwide and historically, the existence of a federal army is 
considered to be essential for the functioning of a federal state. From this point of view 
creation of the European Army seems to be logical step forward. 
Extra reasoning for further deepening of military cooperation is provided by the changing 
security architecture of Europe and its close neighbourhood on the Eastern frontier and 
the Middle East; ongoing EU military and security operations in the framework of EU 
Common Security and Defence Policy and raising threat of international terrorism.  
                                                          
1 Ojanen, H. (2006). The EU and NATO: two competing models for a common defence policy. JCMS: 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(1), 57-76. 
2 Cross, M.D.K. (2007), An EU Homeland Security? Sovereignty vs. Supranational Order, European 
Security, 16:1, 79-97. 
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One significant factor is the United States of America, as the main contributor to NATO, 
with its highest expenditures on their armed forces. During the Cold War it was 
considered a standard in Western Europe, that in the NATO framework the USA have 
been the main contributor of military capabilities balancing the Warssaw Pact block 
military might and keeping peace in Europe. As a result, since the Cold War in Western 
Europe there has been a number of “freeriding” States who have saved on their defence 
for decades. Even while being members of NATO, they have not fulfilled the aim of 
spending the recommended 2% of GDP on the defence. According to the World Bank, in 
2014 only United Kingdom, Poland, Greece and Estonia were close to this goal.3 The rest 
of the EU NATO countries have been spending less. It has caused the situation where 
most of the defence budget in EU countries is spent on salaries and on the militaries’ 
social guarantees. It does not leave resources for upgrading and developing forces and 
causes shortfalls in military key capabilities.  
After the collapse of the USSR and before 2014 the trends and the role of NATO in the 
global arena were changing from the conventional warfare to the peace establishing and 
-supporting/assisting role. It has provided some EU Member States justification for 
further cutting of defence budgets. At the same time, US military presence in Europe is 
not something to be taken as granted – it may change in the future (Shepherd 2003: 39).4  
Also the USA has been facing cuts which has forced Washington to overlook its priorities. 
In the light of a relatively constructive format of NATO - Russia Council and at the same 
time China’s increasing military might  and expansive activities in the East and South 
China Sea5 and North Korea nuclear ambitions combined with the confrontation with the 
USA ally South Korea, the USA was reducing its contingency in Europe (Hyde-Price 
2013: 26-27)6. 2014 and Russia’s aggressive foreign policy has been turning NATO back 
to its traditional role in Europe, but the future of the EU defence remains unclear. The 
                                                          
3 The World Bank. Military expenditure (% of GDP). [online] Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS [Accessed 30 Apr.2016]. 
4 Shepherd, A. J. K. (2003), The European Union's Security and Defence Policy: a policy without 
substance?, European Security, 12:1, 39-63. 
5 Council on Foreign Relations. China´s Maritime Disputes. [online] Available at: http://www.cfr.org/asia-
and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/?cid=ppc-Google-grant-infoguide-
chinas_maritime_disputes-map#!%2F%23historical-context  [Accessed 30 Apr.2016]. 
6 Hyde-Price, A. (2013), Realism: a dissident voice. In S. Biscop and R.G. Whitman, ed, The Routledge 
Handbook of European Security, London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 18-27. 
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ongoing presidential rally in the USA and Mr. Donald Trump´s sayings about the US 
possible exit from NATO7 are adding some uncertainty (Curtis 2016).  
There has been an idea that lack of EU ability to show military force may potentially 
attract neighbouring countries to take challenge and endanger territorial integrity of any 
EU Member State (Salmon 2003:4).8 Due to the changing security environment security 
vacuum in Europe emerges and if EU wants to be able to face future challenges it has to 
put more effort to the independent defence capabilities. Still, EU is not ready to fill this 
military vacuum and the dependence from USA has increased instead of going down.9 
(Techau 2015: 1, 4, 6). It leads to the understanding that exit of the USA from Europe 
may have severe consequences, because without USA presence in Europe there are no 
balance with Russia in order to re-play Cold War model (Rynning 2015: 539-540).10 
It is important to stress that due to the change of NATO –Russia relations starting from 
2014 the situation has changed. As Simon has stated, NATO and USA as lead nation are 
coming back instead of retreating from Europe but still adding pressure to the European 
partners and calling them to do more in order to keep peace in Europe while facing 
Russia´s aggressive foreign policy and military activities on its borders (Simón 2014: 69-
70)11 
The above mentioned aspects of ongoing events may raise a question if and how the EU 
will be able to react in the circumstances if the USA left its role as the main contributor 
in NATO and the EU has to take care of the EU common defence by itself? How would 
it be possible to fill the security vacuum while Russia is behaving aggressively on the EU 
eastern borders and EU Member States have reduced defence budgets? Declaratively, 
with the Treaty of European Union (TEU) Article 42 (7) EU Member States have taken 
                                                          
7 Curtis, M. (2016). Donald Trump and NATO. [online] Available at: 
http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2016/03/donald_trump_and_nato.html [Accessed 30 
Apr.2016]. 
8 Salmon, T-C. (2003), Toward a European army: a military power in the making?, Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner. 2003. 
9 Techau, J. (2015), The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe, Carnegie 
Europe. 
10 Rynning, S. (2015), The false promise of continental concert: Russia, the West and the necessary 
balance of power, International Affairs, vol.91, issue 3, 539-552, May 2015. 
11 Simón, L. (2014), NATO´s Rebirth. Assessing NATO´s Eastern European “Flank”, Parameters 44(3) 
Autumn 2014. 
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obligation to provide help and assistance “by all means in their power” in accordance 
with the UN charter in a case of any Member State(s) is/are attacked. Still, in the author’s 
opinion, there is not a clear model of how the procedure of initiating current formats of 
the EU military cooperation and pooling additional capabilities should take place? Such 
situation would put EU NATO Member States in a dilemma, what the priorities are and 
where States should use the limited capabilities they have, whether to its own defence, to 
NATO in order to defend collectively or to the EU in accordance to the Treaties? 
Another field of challenges of the EU Member States is related to the desired role of the 
EU in the international arena. With Petersberg Tasks first agreed in 1992, Member States 
have agreed to become a global security provider with some achieved success. From the 
creation of the EU common military capabilities more than 30 military operations have 
been conducted in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. At the same time, limited 
availability of critical military capacities endangers credibility and the image of the EU 
and may harm CFSP in general. 
Last but not least, justification for deepening military cooperation and clearing up 
procedures of initiation of the existing EU military formats is related to the time factor. 
The procedure of reaching common decisions and taking real actions has been shown to 
be slow. Long lasting problem solving in the case of Greece monetary crisis and slow 
progress of responding to the migration crises are illustrating the tendency of being some 
steps behind the ongoing events. While Russia has been training and practicing large scale 
activation and movement of its military contingencies, there is a threat that in case of a 
military attack against any EU Member State the EU will not to be able to react timely 
adequately. 
All these factors have raised a public discussion about a possible need to establish 
permanent common armed forces/European Army. For example, the President of the 
European Commission Jean Claude Juncker said in his interview to the Reuters on March 
08, 2015 that NATO is not enough in order to face Russia and other threats. Creation of 
the European Army would create basics for credible and timely response to the threat to 
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peace in any EU Member State or in neighbouring country.12 In his speech he stressed the 
symbolic importance of the creation European Army while /… there have been talk about 
unified European army for decades…/ (Winkfield 2015:7).13 Also German and Italian 
foreign ministers have called for the establishment of European Army (Major and Mölling 
2010: 27).14 Such sayings got answered by the politicians from other EU Member States. 
Security adviser to the President of Poland General Stanislaw Koziej has told that this 
idea is unrealistic dream.15 Similar reflection came from Finnish Parliament Eduskund.16 
Even if the mentioned officials from the EU institutions are not in a position to make it 
happen, spreading of such ideas may indicate that in the EU and its Member States, high 
officials are concerned about the state of the EU self-defence capabilities and there is the 
need to take actions in order to be credible for the partners and at the same time 
intimidating possible opponents.  
Such situation created a number of questions for the author of the thesis. As far as the 
field of CSDP is wide and theoretical background of it is controversial, the narrowed 
focus for the thesis had to be set. It was decided that even if the defence and military 
domain are classically considered to be part of the “high politics” which tends to remain 
in the sovereignty of Member States, there could be some indications of developments on 
the field of the EU common defence visible. Even though it can be considered just as 
indirect evidence of the existence of political will on the EU level to deepen common 
military cooperation, the possible rise of the number of EU official documents related to 
the CSDP, could be observed. In order to assess if the changing situation has initiated 
                                                          
12 EurActive.com, (2015). Juncker: NATO is not enough, EU needs an army. [online] Available at: 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/juncker-nato-is-not-enough-eu-needs-an-army/ 
[Accessed 23 Feb.2016].  
13 Winkfield, E. L.(2015), A European Army. Has the Time Come?, The Real Truth June 1, 2015.  
14 Major, C. and Mölling, C. (2010), EU Military capabilities – some European troops, but not yet a 
European Army. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. EU Crisis Management: Institutions and 
Capabilities in the Making, Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., pp. 11 – 28. 
15 Postimees, (2015). Poola suhtub ELi relvajõudude ideesse skeptiliselt.[online] Available at: 
http://maailm.postimees.ee/3118291/poola-suhtub-eli-relvajoudude-ideesse-skeptiliselt [Accessed 17 
Oct.2015]. 
16 Postimees, (2015). Eduskund ELi ühisarmeest: ebarealistlik idee.[online] Available at: 
http://maailm.postimees.ee/3117751/eduskund-eli-uhisarmeest-ebarealistlik-idee.[Accessed 17 
Oct.2015]. 
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more active CSDP related information exchange within EU official documentation, the 
survey of this documentation was planned. 
In order to provide a comprehensive picture of CSDP, the current status of it and to assess 
if the new security environment of Europe is reflected in EU official documentation, the 
following study questions were set: 
- What progress has been made in the field of common defence/creation of 
European Army so far? 
- Has the changing security situation within the EU and its neighbourhood caused 
the rise of the number of documents concerning the CSDP?  
- Does the most used CSDP related official terminology, covered by the EU official 
documentation, indicate support to the idea of deepening military cooperation 
and/or creating Common Armed Forces/European Army? 
The first study question has an explanative role while the main focus is on the EU 
documentation analyses. Conducted survey included analyses of documents found in the 
EU official database EUR Lex. It covered 2291 defence domain related original 
documents created by the European Commission and its sub-organizations, the European 
Parliament and its members, the Council of the European Union, the Court of Justice, the 
Court of Auditors, Member States etc. The suggestion of the author was that if the change 
of dynamics in CSDP related documentation occurs, it can be visible starting from 2014 
when Russia initiated events in the Crimean Peninsula and Eastern Ukraine. Another key 
event theoretically influencing the dynamics of documentation and having a direct impact 
on the EU security, is the migration crisis which reached large scales in 2015. In order to 
provide comparative material and illustrate the dynamics of documentation before the 
crisis, the timeframes set to the survey are from January 01, 2009 till December 31, 2015. 
The reason behind setting such starting date is the fact that from this date Lisbon Treaty 
entered into force. CSDP in a format as it is known now, is established with Lisbon 
Treaty. 
The main outcome from the analyses is that despite the changing security environment 
within the EU and beyond its borders, it has not impacted the dynamics of EU official 
12 
 
documentation. Annual figures of security and defence related documents have remained 
relatively stable despite the Ukrainian crisis, changing relationships with Russia and the 
ongoing refugee crisis which have been influencing EU security and defence domains in 
recent years. Most used CSDP related terms are not indicating support to the deepening 
military cooperation within the EU and/or progressing towards Common Armed 
Forces/European Army. From the results of the conducted survey and academic 
discourse, provided in the theoretical overview, it can be concluded that despite some 
progress made in the framework of CSDP, it is not likely that in the near future there will 
be any significant progress made towards creation of common armed forces/European 
army.   
The outcomes of the survey are leading to the suggestion that even though with Treaties 
the EU Member States have delegated the field of common security and defence issues 
to the EU supranational institutions, in real life these institutions do not have a strong 
influence on the field of security and defence, while in the case of real life emergencies 
intergovernmental exchange of information is likely to have a more significant role. 
Another suggestion is that as far as EU Member States have delegated CFSP to the EU, 
surveyed EU official documentation may exist but it is classified. In both described cases 
such kind of information exchange is not visible for common citizens, which may explain 
the results of the current survey. 
Despite discouraging conclusions, according to the author’s opinion, it is worthwhile to 
monitor the dynamics of the EU public official documentation also in the future. The 
reasoning for further studies is rooted in the democracy practiced in the EU. The creation 
of the permanent common armed forces/European Army can be assessed to be a 
fundamental change, influencing all people living in the EU. In order to make it happen, 
support of the domestic electorates to the decision makers has to be guaranteed. It means 
that if it is wanted by the political elite, the idea has to be discussed publicly. From this 
point of view the current sayings of the EU and National high level officials can be 
assessed as a test of public opinion which indicates the possible presence of political will 
of creating Common armed Forces/European Army in the future. If true, it may mean that 
in the future the topic of common defence can be reflected in Eur Lex published 
documentation with significant rise of the topic related documents. 
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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The destruction caused by World War II and opposition with the Soviet Union with its 
allies forced the Western European leaders think about keeping military balance in 
Europe and take actions in order to avoid any armed conflict on the soil of Europe. The 
first active steps took place in 1950ies when European Communities (EC) were 
established. Even though initially such communities covered just some economic aspects 
in Western Europe, Altiero Spinelli was already then promoting the idea of united Europe. 
He proposed to use the US Constitution as an example and to develop similar architecture 
of institutions in Europe (Glencross 2009: 287).17 He believed that the future of Europe 
is a federal state with federal armed forces included. Thus, the European Defence 
Community was meant to become a supranational organisation with common institutions, 
armed forces and budget and acting in the framework of NATO. Units were supposed to 
be formed by the nationality (Salmon 2003: 22).18  
On the contrary, David Mitrany, as a representative of functionalistic thinking, saw 
common military defence as a combination of different forms of military cooperation in 
Europe. Each format was supposed to meet a specific challenge. He did not see the need 
for permanent common military structures (Anderson 1998).19 Such a multi-layered 
approach characterizes the status of the EU common defence also nowadays. With the 
failure of EDC in 1954, initial opportunity to create common military forces was lost 
(Binder 2007: 575).20 Yugoslavian wars in the early 1990 brought up again the need for 
military cooperation within the EU. Since then the EU has gone through the process of 
building up legal framework and setting the functioning principles of common defence 
structures. 
From the viewpoint of theorists such development has been complicated to explain. 
Different theories have not managed to agree upon the reasoning, nature and significance 
                                                          
17 Glencross A., (2009), Altiero Spinelli and the Idea of the US Constitution as a Model for Europe: The 
Promises and Pitfalls of an Analogy, Journal of Common Market Studies; Mar2009, Vol. 47 Issue 2, p287-
307. 
18 Salmon, T-C. (2003), Toward a European army: a military power in the making?, Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner. 2003. 
19 Anderson, D. (1998), David Mitrany (1888-1975): an appreciation of his life and work, Review of 
International Studies; Oct1998, Vol. 24 Issue: Number 4, pp. 577-592. 
20 Binder, J. (2007), Altiero Spinelli's European Federal Odyssey, International Spectator; Dec 2007, Vol. 
42 Issue: Number 4, pp. 571-588. 
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of the creation and evolution of CSDP with its military component included. Generally 
saying, there are two overarching controversial disciplinary approaches. International 
Relations and European Integration theories try to cover this subject. They include a 
variety of different theoretical viewpoints to the CSDP. Namely, neo-realism suggests 
that CSDP is dominated by some influential lead nations within the EU. Liberal 
intergovernmentalism does not see the process of European military integration taking 
place at all. Neo functionalism does not see continuation of “spillover” into domain of 
foreign and security policy as to the ground of “high politics”. Supranationalism admits 
the creation of supranational institutions on different fields but excludes security and 
defence area from this process. Institutionalism with its rational choice theory hopes with 
the help of CSDP to improve the decision making process in the EU, still with the 
condition of keeping most of the control in the hands of member states. Constructivism 
tries to find out how CSDP reflects and generates the European normative approach. It 
believes that international relations are historically and socially constructed not rationally 
created (Howorth 2007: 192 – 211).21 And it is not a full spectrum of theories trying to 
explain ongoing processes.  
As demonstrated, a number of theories have different approaches to the nature of CSDP 
while stressing different aspects of it. There is one part most of theories agree upon. It is 
likely that there is a long way to go before real integration of European national military 
forces could take place. Still, commonly conducted military operations are a reality and 
progress on the field of deepening military cooperation is made. With the goal to clarify 
the functioning of EU commonly ran military activities, evolvement of CSDP throughout 
different Treaties and legal framework of EU military cooperation is explained.    
Yugoslav Wars, which forced the EU to take new initiatives on the field of security and 
defence, started in 1991 with a war in Slovenia. As a response to such dramatic events 
taking place on European soil, in 1992 the Petersberg Tasks were called to life. It was the 
first attempt of the EU to set up framework for common military activities. Initially tasks 
outlined the following three purposes for which military units could be deployed: 
                                                          
21 Howorth, J. (2007). Security and defence policy in the European Union. New York. pp. 190 – 215. 
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humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping; tasks in crisis management, including 
peacemaking.22   
1993 Maastricht Treaty created a pillar system with the aim to extend EU authority in 
some policy areas including Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which was set 
under pillar two. In 1997 EU member states agreed with the Amsterdam Treaty upon the 
creation of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as a major element of CFSP. 
The next milestone of building up EU independent military capacity was the Cologne 
European Council in 1999. It widened the fields of Petersberg tasks (Cutler&Von Lingen 
2003: 10).23 In relations to Kosovo War and with the plan of EU military involvement 
there, the Council declared that the EU must have an independent military capacity, 
backed up by credible military forces. 
With the latest treaty - Treaty of Lisbon (TEU) 2009 ESDP was renamed to the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the pillar system was merged into one. TEU 
Article 42 expanded Petersberg tasks to include: humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict 
prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance 
tasks; post-conflict stabilisation tasks.24 Additionally, the basis of military cooperation 
originated from the TEU Article 42 VII which contains the principle of “one for all, all 
for one”.25 If one or more member state(s) is/are attacked, the other member states have 
an obligation to provide help and assistance “by all means in their power” in accordance 
with the UN charter. Such principle covers also the member states which do not belong 
to NATO (Brinkmann 2013).26 Another aspect of solidarity concerns common actions in 
                                                          
22 EEAS. [online] Available at:  http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/petersberg/index_en.htm / 
[Accessed 26 Apr.2016]. 
23 Cutler, R. and Von Lingen, A. (2003), The European Parliament and European Union Security and 
Defence Policy, European Security, 12:2, 1-20. 
24 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. [online] Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN  [Accessed 26 Apr.2016]. 
25 Treaty on European Union [online]. Available at: http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-
making/treaties/pdf/treaty_on_european_union/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf   [Accessed 30 
Mar. 2016]. 
26 Brinkmann, M. (2013), First Steps to a European Union Army, Embassy, May15, 2013-14. 
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cases of terrorist attacks and man-made disasters. It is stated in TFEU Article 222.27 
Listed up clauses are legally binding for the member states and they should provide 
reasoning to work towards deeper military cooperation. 
From the progress described above the development towards delegating more jurisdiction 
from the member states to the EU and at least declaratively contributing more military 
capabilities can be observed. In order to back up security and defence related goals taken 
by member states with Treaties, the European Council has set military capability targets 
with headline goals. The goals related to the military portion of the ESDP have been 
ambitious. Initially, during Helsinki meeting 1999 there was a political will to create a 
European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) by 2003 consisting of a force of 60,000 troops 
which would be deployable anywhere in the world within 60 days, capable of fulfilling 
the Petersberg tasks and which is to be sustainable for a year (Youngs 2002: 102).28 The 
EU has not stopped at setting such goals. In 2008 the EU Council agreed on Declaration 
on Strengthening Capabilities which set goals to be able to run simultaneously two 
stabilisation and reconstruction operations with the involvement of 10,000 troops plus 
civilians; two rapid response operations with the use of EU Battle Groups; CIMIC 
humanitarian assistance operation and one major civilian mission (up to 3,000 personnel) 
plus some smaller ones.29 Consequently, such a set of goals is widening the gap between 
ambitions and real capabilities (Major and Mölling 2010: 19).30 It is problematic that as 
a result the EU is having some capabilities just on paper (Gordon 2000: 12).31  
Still, from this brief overview the process of deepening the EU influence in the domain 
of “high politics” is visible. It theoretically indicates the existence of political will and 
readiness from member states to partly delegate the field of security and defence to the 
                                                          
27 The Treaty of Functioning of the European Union [online]. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT [Accessed 30 Mar. 2016]. 
28 Youngs, R. (2002), The European Security and Defence Policy: what impact on the EU’s approach to 
security challenges?, European Security 11/2, pp.101–124. 
29 Declaration of Strengthening Capabilities (2008). [online] Available at:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/104676.pdf [Accessed 15 
May.2016]. 
30 Major, C. and Mölling, C. (2010), EU Military capabilities – some European troops, but not yet a 
European Army. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. EU Crisis Management: Institutions and 
Capabilities in the Making, Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., pp. 11 – 28. 
31 Gordon, B. H. (2000), Their Own Army?, Foreign Affairs, New York, 79(4) July/August 2000, pp 12-17 .  
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EU. Still, one may have doubts if common armed forces are required at all? There are 
some practical needs and benefits supporting the necessity of common armed forces. 
Namely rational calculus of pooling capabilities, because National wide-range defence is 
too expensive, while common defence would provide possibilities to specialize and to 
develop niche capabilities. Thus, it would save resources and provide more force (Major 
& Mölling: 2010: 22 - 24).32 In addition, optional benefits from creating credible military 
force are: freeing US troops from Europe, making EU more capable partner and player in 
global level; providing tools for dealing any major security crisis with or without US 
involvement (Gordon 2000:12 – 13).33 Also, CSDP can be considered as a tool for the 
EU on becoming more credible and coherent foreign policy actor (Saviolo 2015: 36).34 
While comparing progress made on the field of common military framework with the 
practical need of helping the EU to become a more credible player in the global arena and 
helping to save limited resources, it may look like the creation of permanent common 
armed forces/European Army is just a matter of time. Real life does not support such 
optimism. Even though member states have declaratively partly already delegated such 
field of “high politics” to the supranational institutions, there is the ambition to avoid 
CSDP of becoming too influential and effective. There are few aspects of it. For example, 
most sceptical countries like UK, Denmark, Finland and Sweden are critical concerning 
the security and defence integration and not willing to invest in it (Peters 2014: 398).35 
Also, most of NATO-EU members are not able to fulfil 2% criteria spending on their 
national defence and they are not keen to invest additionally to the EU common armed 
forces. It may be concluded that lack of resources is crucial factor undermining 
development of CSDP. 
Additionally, member states have retained control over the field of common defence. It 
is because more authority is delegated to the Council than to the EU institutions (Howorth 
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2007: 206 - 207).36 Intergovernmental nature of CSDP through the format of Foreign 
Affairs Council leaves to the Member States opportunity to dictate to the EU mission 
mandate, objectives, scope, duration, chain of command, national contributions (Comelli 
2010: 81).37 On the one hand it guarantees for the Member States that EU institutions will 
not become too influential to take a lead over common defence. On the other hand, such 
situation makes decision making process slow and complicated and reduces credibility of 
EU in total.   
Summing up the theoretical overview it may be concluded that there is progress made on 
a field of CSDP´s military portion: legal framework and goals are set; real life operations 
are conducted and still ongoing; the system of pooling capabilities is established. All 
mentioned fragments would not be possible to be introduced without having political will 
and readiness of member states to act commonly. Despite that theorists have not managed 
to agree upon the phenomenon of CSDP. At a glance, the development made may be 
interpreted as a permanently ongoing progress toward creation of (federal) common 
armed forces/European army. At the same time in reality CSDP appears to be a 
complicated fragmented and multi-layered construct including a controversial 
combination of economic, political and national ambitions and conflicts. In the light of 
such complicated background framework, in the next chapter an overview of traditional 
and new forms of modern armed forces will be provided. Also an assessment about the 
status and the progress made within CSDP. 
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2. TRADITIONAL- AND COMMON ARMED FORCES 
NOWADAYS 
As seen in the previous chapter, despite significant criticism made by the different 
authors, there have been some developments on the field of EU common defence. The 
current chapter provides a brief overview of modern armed forces. The focus is on general 
build-up and subordination of the forces. The first part of the chapter explains the 
functioning of armed forces in classical states while the next part describes modern armed 
forces in the framework of international organisations like UN and NATO. It covers the 
manning, funding and legal status of the combined armed forces.  
The main part of the chapter describes in a more detailed manner the status and the forms 
of military cooperation within CSDP. Some authors are used in order to give an 
assessment about the progress made. While comparing “classical” armed forces with the 
common armed forces within international organisations, it can be said that permanent 
military bodies on the level of EU combined with temporary rotation based Battle Groups 
remind more other international organisations than traditional armies.  
The author of the thesis goes further and in the discussion part of the chapter proposes an 
alternate build-up of EU military structures. It would be the size of a military structure 
which would not endanger any EU Member States even if subordinated directly to the EU 
supranational organisations. At the same time it would guarantee the quicker response of 
the EU to any crisis with the need of military involvement. Such readiness of quick 
response would add credibility to the EU in general. Also, such an additional military 
asset would help to win some extra time for the Member States in order to reach 
agreements about further common actions required in solving the crisis.  
2.1 Traditional armed forces in national- and federal states  
Nowadays countries can be divided into unitary states, federal states and confederations. 
According to the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, the components 
of different forms of States are: territory, citizenship, allocation of competences to the 
central (federal) authorities.38 In case of unitary states the status of armed forces is 
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[Accessed 09 Oct.2015]. 
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obvious. The highest commander of the armed forces may vary, but basically in all cases, 
army is subordinated to central authorities.  
The samples of confederations are Belgium, Canada and Switzerland. In Belgium and 
Canada the Commander in Chief respectively are King Philipp and Queen Elizabeth II. 
These persons are on these posts symbolically while real life leadership belongs to the 
Chiefs of Defence (CHOD). In Switzerland the Chief of the Armed Forces is Lieutenant 
General André Blattmann. In all described cases the armed forces are funded by State 
budget and led by central governments.  
While describing federal states, as of 2016 there are ca 25 federal countries in the world. 
They are geographically spread to all continents. Some significant samples of federations 
are: Germany, Spain and Russia in Europe; India, Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab 
Emirates in Asia; Mexico, Canada, the United States of America (US) in America; 
Nigeria, South Africa in Africa, Australia Micronesia.39  
In the United States of America, which is considered to be world´s oldest continuing 
federal democracy with the country’s second Federal Constitution from 1789 /… raise an 
army and navy …/ was given to the federal government.40 On the other hand, in the United 
States of America, the states may have their own army and air force units, subordinating 
to the governors.41 Still, these units are only for use within the state in case of emergencies 
while the US federal armed forces are used worldwide. In other cases also in federal states 
armed forces are subordinated to the central government. 
Depending on the size, geography, number of population, level of nation’s welfare of a 
country, the structure of armed forces may differ, but the basic build up remains the same. 
For effective functioning of armed forces the main pillars are: the components of 
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command and control (C2); logistics, including combat support and logistic support 
elements; and combat units are essentially required.  
While summarizing “classical” states’ armed forces build-up, it can be concluded that in 
unitary- and federal states the common trait is that armed forces are financed and guided 
by the central governments. At the same time, as mentioned above, after World War II, a 
new type of common armed forces were established. Next, armed forces in the framework 
of an international organisation are explained.  
2.2 Common armed forces in framework of international organizations 
NATO and United Nations 
In the late 20th and the beginning of 21 century in conditions of globalisation and the 
raise of big international organisation, a new type of common armed forces was required. 
It is caused by the change of the character of modern armed conflicts. Nowadays, an 
armed conflict does not necessarily mean a military conflict with the use of conventional 
forces between two or more countries. Now it may include an armed confrontation with 
militant groups with a big scale of collateral damage to the infrastructure and population 
living in the conflict area. Such new methods of asymmetrical- and hybrid warfare have 
been challenging traditional military forces. A solution is found through international 
organisations.  As far as international organisations have taken bigger roles of peace 
establishment, peace enforcement, crisis management and assistance, new forms of 
common armed forces are created.  
In essence the idea of common armed forces is not new. At Medieval Age vassals 
provided troops and equipment to the ruler for certain periods and military campaigns. 
Similar principle is adopted nowadays in the framework of international organizations 
like UN and NATO. 
UN, consisting of 193 states, is trying to address all crises taking place in the world. In 
order to act, the mandate from the UN Security Council is required. The legal basis 
originates from Chapter VII of the Charter and the active measures taken are aimed at 
maintaining or restoring international peace and security, facilitating political 
processes, protecting civilians, assisting disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration of former combatants; supporting constitutional processes and the 
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organization of elections, protecting and promoting human rights and assisting in 
restoring the rule of law and extending legitimate state authority. If the risk is assessed to 
be relatively low, Security Council in coordination with the General Assembly establishes 
peacekeeping operations ran by the UN. As of April 2016, since 1948 there are 69 
peacekeeping missions deployed worldwide.42  
Since the UN does not have its own armed forces, the force generation is based on the 
UN Member States volunteer contributions. Participating nations agree upon the lead 
nation which carries the main burden. Normally, this state contributes most of the troops 
and capabilities and therefore has the leading/key positions of the force structure. After 
reaching this agreement, force generation conferences are initiated where participating 
nations agree upon their share. All UN military operations are managed by the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and supported by the Department of Field 
Support. Which mean that the UN has two permanent pillars out of three. The Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations represents C2 and the Department of Field Support is 
equivalent to the logistic support pillar. Combat units are pooled for each mission 
separately. 
If the UN assesses some specific crisis to be more dangerous and stronger military 
intervention from outside is required for establishing peace, the UN mandate is provided 
to NATO.     
NATO functions basically in the same way as explained with the UN. One difference is 
that NATO has a complicated permanent structure of Headquarters (HQ), which are 
divided hierarchically into the political NATO HQ; Strategical (Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Allied Command of Transformation (ACT)); 
Operational (Allied Command of Operations (ACO)) and to the Tactical levels with 
numerous lower level HQs. It is important to note that NATO owns a number of 
capabilities like strategical air lift and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 
assets. Another difference from the UN is that NATO keeps some units in permanent 
readiness. An example of it is the Multinational Corps North-East (MNC-NE) which is 
stationed in Poland and which is responsible for maintaining a stable situation in Eastern 
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Europe. Also NATO has the system of NATO Response Force (NRF) which is currently 
in the phase of being transformed to the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) 
format. NRF is based on rotation-based contributions of NATO Member States which 
provide troops and capabilities in order to keep up a credible military force. Decision for 
deployments is taken by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) consisting of high-level 
representatives of each member country.43 
In a case of having a UN mandate and NAC decision, NATO Member States and 
partnering nations are providing additional troops and assets required for running the 
operation. To sum-up, when comparing to the UN, NATO is more capable in military 
means and able to run simultaneously more than one large scale operation worldwide. 
Since the foundation, NATO has been responding to the changing security environment. 
After the end of Cold War and the raise of need for the peace support operations, NATO 
changed its focus from conventional warfare to smaller contingencies running Counter 
Insurgency Operations (COIN) worldwide. With the rise of Russia’s aggressive foreign 
politics in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East in recent years, NATO is turning back 
to conventional warfare. Also new forms of NATO cooperation are initiated. For 
example, British-led seven-nation Joint Expeditionary Force, which also includes Nordic 
and Baltic countries adding extra credibility in the Baltic Sea region.  Simón has found 
that if Ukraine falls under the influence of Russia, “security buffer” between Russia and 
Central Europe will be lost, thus it is crucial to deepen the links with non-NATO countries 
Finland and Sweden (Simón 2014: 72).44 For this purpose traditionally neutral 
Scandinavian countries are more and more involved in common military exercises with 
NATO. Also, it has to be noted that these countries are contributing more to NATO led 
operations.  
Another example of adapting to the change of security environment in Central- and 
Eastern Europe is the decision made during Wales Summit 2014. Some counter measures 
in order to keep high alert readiness were taken. It includes creation of new staff elements 
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(NATO Force Integration Units – NFIU) in Eastern European countries and calling up 
the above mentioned Very High Readiness Force (VJTF) in order to respond quicker to 
hostile activities on EU borders.45 In addition, NATO is pooling more conventional armed 
forces in order to keep balance with Russia.  
These steps within NATO and with the partner nations are indicating that NATO is in 
constant change and their will to adapt to the new challenges is serving as a positive 
example for the EU with its formats of military cooperation. Next an overview about the 
current state of the EU´s military cooperation will be given. 
2.3 Current state of military cooperation within EU 
This sub-chapter provides an overview of progress made so far on the field of CSDP. It 
explains some positive sides and weaknesses brought up by different authors. In addition 
to it, the information got from home pages of the EU military institutions is used in order 
to give a comprehensive overview of the topic. CSDP in its different forms have been 
developing already more than twenty years. The time is enough to make some significant 
progress. Some positive aspects of the CSDP will follow. 
2.3.1 Positive aspects of the CSDP 
An important aspect of the success of ESDP/CSDP is the existence of the support of the 
EU electorate. From the survey conducted in 2014 can be concluded that people tend to 
hand over legitimacy of the CFSDP (including CSDP) to the EU level. In other words, 
people are in favour of giving this domain to the jurisdiction of EU supranational 
institutions. Another outcome is that Euro-sceptics and Euro-supporters saw equally 
European army roles in territorial defence and keeping peace in Europe. In this meaning 
the expectations of citizens differ from political agreements between member states. For 
the member states Petersberg Tasks and EU Battle groups within it, are meant for 
operations abroad while surveyed citizens are not keen to support EU military operations 
overseas and having expectations for territorial defence of the EU (Peters 2014: 389 – 
403).46 
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In 2009 another survey was conducted among military personnel and Member States 
officials. They interviewed military personnel and state officials. Even though National 
defence was considered to be a core attribute of state sovereignty, there was wide support 
among the ESDP actors to the conducted operations and initiatives in place. Expectations 
of ESDP actors included also purely military roles (out from Petersberg Tasks). Namely 
defending territorial integrity (48%) and peace (45%) in the EU. 85% of diplomats and 
92% of interviewed military personnel saw creation of EU Battle Groups as step forward 
towards European Army (Mérand and others 2009: 338 – 339).47 
It is worthwhile to mention that some progress is made on a ground of building up 
common military culture. Whilst training and serving together, militaries from different 
Member states are creating common understandings and procedures which simplifies 
deepening of future cooperation. Creation of EU institutions as European Union Military 
Staff, European Defence Agency, EUROCORPS and EU (regional) Battle Groups have 
established basis for developing more complex and wide-range forms of military 
cooperation. The same idea is also supported by the commonly conducted real-life 
operations in frames of CSDP. In this way, the progress on field of CSDP can be 
considered as next step of federalisation. Moreover, according to King, creation of 
military culture deepens interdependence between militaries and simplifies creation of 
common army in the future (King 2006: 273 – 274).48  Still, the further progress on a field 
of creating military culture could be done (Moustakis & Violakis 2008: 432).49 
Important is to stress that as of 2016 already the number of EU military structures 
established and missions accomplished and in process are indicating political will of 
building up credible capabilities. In more practical means, the main success is ability to 
keep up two Battle Groups in time. Operations Headquarters are also operational (Major 
& Mölling: 2010: 16).50 
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From the arguments above it can be concluded that there are positive sides of CSDP and 
establishing the framework for military cooperation between EU Member States. These 
steps have been interpreted by the officials, militaries and regular citizens as positive step 
forward. But not all authors are in favour of CSDP. Overview of shortfalls on this field 
will follow.  
2.3.2 Criticism on CSDP and military cooperation within it 
Some scholars have assessed EU military cooperation so far not to be success story to be 
proud of. Since the creation it has been facing wide variety of challenges which may lead 
to the controversial results.  
It appeared that EU was helpless during Yugoslavian war and depending on NATO, 
mainly US military capabilities. Kosovo events have demonstrated that US was 
dominating in Europe while Europeans did not have proper framework and capabilities 
to deal with challenges (Gordon 2000: 12).51 Even though Europe had at these days more 
than 2 million troops, EU was not able to pool it (Major & Mölling: 2010: 12).52 Positive 
side of Yugoslavian war was that it brought up weaknesses and shortfalls of the European 
militaries. It leaded to the creation of its own military framework.  
After Lisbon Treaty and 9/11 were was an expectation that the EU would adapt its defence 
policy to changing needs. Initially there was a hope that on mid-2003 EU military 
framework will reach its full operational capability (FOC) with 60 000 troops included. 
The next timeframe for this goal was set to 2008-2010 (Dempsey &White 2001).53 
(Moustakis & Violakis 2008: 429) 54 and (Biscop & Coelmont 2010: 7 - 8)55 have 
interpreted it as a lack of strategy and vision within CSDP. And as of 2016 this goal is 
still not achieved. Also there are no readiness and will to make CSDP properly working. 
                                                          
51 Gordon, B. H. (2000), Their Own Army?, Foreign Affairs, New York, 79(4) July/August 2000, pp 12-17 . 
52 Major, C. and Mölling, C. (2010), EU Military capabilities – some European troops, but not yet a 
European Army. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. EU Crisis Management: Institutions and 
Capabilities in the Making, Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., pp. 11 – 28. 
53 Dempsey, J. and White, D. (2001), Not Rapid Enough: Lack of Money and Clear Goals is Hampering 
Plans for an EU Defence Force, Financial Times, 19 November 2001. 
54 Moustakis, F. and Violakis, P. (2008), European Security and Defence Policy Deceleration: An 
Assessment of the ESDP Strategy, European Security, 17:4, 421-433. 
55 Biscop, S. and Coelmont, J. (2010), A Strategy for CSDP Europe's Ambitions as a Global Security 
Provider, (Egmont Papers 37), Egmont - The Royal Institute for International Relations, Academia Press. 
27 
 
Another serious field of challenges concerns finances and pooling resources.  Even 
though there has been some development on National level on pooling forces, it is not 
reflecting improvement of European Army (Major and Mölling 2010: 15).56 Additionally 
it has been stated, that the member states are lacking means (Gordon 2000: 13).57 
Shepherd has named it as shortfall of capabilities (Shepherd 2003: 40).58 Winn has listed 
up following shortfalls: lack of sharing intelligence, lack of heavy lift capabilities, 
precision-guided missiles, anti-air defence and forces projections. Also he sees the 
challenge in interoperability of troops. In his opinion, standardisation of equipment and 
procedures are limited (Winn 2003:.49)59.  
Pooling agreed resources has one more aspect what is not widely discussed. If member 
states set a goal to create 60 000 troops strong military force, it covers only 1/3 of the real 
need (Dempsey &White 2001).60 As far as the Battle Groups system is functioning on 
rotational bases, there should be three rotations made available for the EU. One is on 
active duty with high readiness, another one on preparation and training phase. And the 
third rotation is off duty, dealing with their national tasks. From this it can be calculated 
that the real need of fully manned common forces is 180 thousand troops.  
Separate serious issue is a lack of funding (Salmon 2003: 2, 12-13).61 Also the matter of 
funding the EU Rapid Reaction Force has been raised– how the costs should be shared 
and how big is supposed to be the burden for individual Member States (Dempsey 
&White 2001).62 Matter of fair division of costs on common armed forces is boosted by 
the fact that not all member states are full members of NATO. Due to that, some member 
states have to invest to national defence and to the both organisations while some are 
                                                          
56 Major, C. and Mölling, C. (2010), EU Military capabilities – some European troops, but not yet a 
European Army. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. EU Crisis Management: Institutions and 
Capabilities in the Making, Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., pp. 11 – 28. 
57 Gordon, B. H. (2000), Their Own Army?, Foreign Affairs, New York, 79(4) July/August 2000, pp 12-17 . 
58 Shepherd, A. J. K. (2003), The European Union's Security and Defence Policy: a policy without 
substance?, European Security, 12:1, 39-63. 
59 Winn, N. (2003), Towards a Common European Security and Defence Policy? The Debate on NATO, 
the European Army and Transatlantic Security, Geopolitics, 8:2, 47-68. 
60 Dempsey, J. and White, D. (2001), Not Rapid Enough: Lack of Money and Clear Goals is Hampering 
Plans for an EU Defence Force, Financial Times, 19 November 2001. 
61 Salmon, T-C. (2003), Toward a European army: a military power in the making?, Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner. 2003. 
62 Dempsey, J. and White, D. (2001), Not Rapid Enough: Lack of Money and Clear Goals is Hampering 
Plans for an EU Defence Force, Financial Times, 19 November 2001.  
28 
 
privileged to stay out from investing in NATO and they pay only to CSDP. On top of that 
some EU member states are contributing also to UN peace-keeping operations which 
makes it even more unequal. The matter of funding can be explained with a lack of 
political will (Bickerton and others 2011: 14)63 
Some criticism is caused by the fact that NATO and EU are having overlapping parts of 
their goals when it comes to crisis management. For example, EU Battle Groups created 
on 2007 are a smaller and less capable alternate to the NATO Response Force (NRF) 
created on 2003. Duplication of efforts can be seen also on Red Sea there EU Operation 
Atalanta and NATO´s Ocean Shield are addressing piracy in Somalia (Duke & 
Vanhoonacker 2015: 10 – 11).64 At the same time such duplication provides a potential 
field for saving resources if better coordinated.  
Another domain of duplication of efforts and resources, is the division between CSDP 
military- and civil components. The basis of CSDP and Petersberg Tasks is the 
understanding that EU is not willing to be seen with a use of military “hard power” in 
international arena. Also European Council has been determined, EU to focus to the non-
military crisis management and post war reconstruction (Winn 2003:.49).65 It explains 
why in a case of crisis management operations, planning is separated for military- and 
civil intervention, instead of doing it together (Major and Mölling 2010: 18).66 It leads to 
the low level of coordination and to the waist of limited resources.   
Separate reason of having inefficient common forces is due to individual interests and 
expectations of Member States. In order to highlight different views to the EU security 
and defence integration UK, Denmark, Finland, Sweden can be mentioned as the most 
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sceptical Member States (Peters 2014: 404).67 In the author’s opinion, the stance of 
Finland may be caused by their historical experience while fighting successfully alone 
against the USSR during Winter War. At the same time while being in alliance with Nazi 
Germany Finland lost its territory of Karelia to the USSR. As a result nowadays Finland 
does not belong to NATO and people believe that country should be able to defend itself 
independently. Sweden politics are rooted in the long lasting tradition of being a neutral 
country. UK is traditionally one of the strongest armed forces in the world and it is not 
ready to give up any capabilities it currently has. Denmark has had strong influence of 
domestic electorate. As a result it has opted out from CSDP. 
To be more precise, federal countries headed by France and Benelux countries are looking 
forward of taking bigger role in EU and to exclude US from being such important part of 
EU security and defence (Winn 2003:.49).68 In addition, at the same time France and UK 
are willing to transform EU to the more credible crisis management actor (Howorth 
&Menon 2009: 734).69 Germany looks to deepening military cooperation within the EU 
as a tool for strengthening NATO. Also they consider it as another step of EU integration. 
On the contrary, Poland is not willing to duplicate resources and effort between NATO 
and EU military portion (Lang 2002: 107 – 108).70  
An interesting viewpoint is provided by Saviolo. In his opinion CSDP is not for 
strengthening EU position in international arena. It is a tool for EU Member States to 
avoid re-unified Germany of becoming regional hegemon. (Saviolo 1999: 34).71 
Such controversial interests of EU member states are explaining why it is so difficult to 
proceed with the idea of Common Armed Forces/ European Army. Still, there are 
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different military institutions/structures established in frames of CSDP. Next a brief 
overview of them is provided.  
2.3.3 Forms of military cooperation within EU  
As of 2015 in the framework of CSDP functioning forms of military co-operation are 
European Military Committee, European Union Military Staff, European Defence 
Agency, EUROCORPS and EU Battle Groups. Political Guidance is provided by the 
Political and Security Committee (Brinkmann 2013).72 
EU Military Staff is providing Command and Control assets and military advice to the 
EU institutions. It is to define defence capability requirements for the EU military 
structures. Currently EUMS is not leading EU military operations and there is no link 
between strategic - and operational level planning (Quille 2010:70).73 Operational level 
planning is conducted by the headquarters called to life for specific EU military 
operations. Still, in the author’s opinion EUMS can be considered as a permanent military 
planning component which can be developed further if the member states agree upon the 
creation of the European Army or deepening common military cooperation. 
European Defence Agency (EDA) was created from the unification of The Western 
European Armament Group (WEAG) and The Western European Armament 
Organization (WEAO). The mission of EDA includes: /… developing defence 
capabilities; promoting defence research and technology; promoting armaments 
cooperation and creating  a competitive European Defence Equipment Market and 
strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base…/ As seen, 
ambition goals are set while since 2010 the budget of EDA has remained ca 30,5 million 
euros.74 Which means that EDA is limited by the member States which are not willing to 
make it capable, and by the small budget (Major and Mölling 2010: 16).75 Due to financial 
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limitations, in real life EDA is mainly concentrated on coordinating and assisting the 
member states common military procurements.  The rest of the goals are getting limited 
attention. Consequently it means that EDA is acting as component of logistic pillar of 
armed forces build up. 
EUROCORPS and EU Battle Groups are physical components of military forces able to 
be deployed and to be self-sustainable for limited period. EUROCORPS is unique concept 
currently consisting of five framework nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg 
and Spain. The size of the unit is up to 1,500 troops. Along the European Member- and 
associated nations there are two participating countries from outside the EU. Canada and 
Turkey have also been part of it, which raises some questions. For example, what would 
happen if the EU is willing to use EUROCORPS as a stabilizing force in Cyprus? How 
would Turkey as an associated nation act? As of 2016, Austria, Canada and Finland have 
quit this format for different reasons.76 In the case of Austria and Finland it may be 
suggested that as far as EUROCORPS has been used for operations conducted under the 
command of NATO, these countries as non-NATO members decided not to participate, 
because for such nations there are significant security and operational limitations in place.  
EU Battle Groups system consists of 18 Battle Groups with ca 1,500 troops each. Full 
operational capabilities were achieved 2007. The readiness includes half a year stand by 
period for two Battle Groups at a time in rotational bases. Battle Groups have framework 
nations providing most of the troops and resources while other member states can 
contribute with niche capabilities and assets. As a result most Battle Groups are 
multinational. It is important to note that so far Battle Groups have acted in accordance 
with Petersberg Tasks which means that they are used outside the EU territory. 
The difference between EUROCORPS and EU Battle Groups is that EUROCORPS is 
focused on NATO operations while EU Battle Groups serve the interests of the EU. 
Problematic is that EU has two military structures which are able to respond to the crisis 
taking place outside of the EU. At the same time EU does not have an agreed procedure 
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and/or common military force which could take action in case of a crisis taking place in 
a territory of any EU Member State.  
2.4 Discussion 
As demonstrated in this chapter, the essence of armed forces has been changing. 
Historically (federal) army has been a permanent military body subordinated to the central 
government. 20th and 21st century have turned this model to the creation of temporary 
acting military forces in the framework of international organizations like NATO and the 
United Nations. From this point of view, the idea of having multinational combined forces 
is not unique and theoretically should be feasible for the EU.  
While concentrating to the EU common military framework, CSDP was called to life with 
a purpose to make EU to more credible player in international arena. If policy is failing it 
may act vice versa. Bentinck (2014: 5-6) has assessed that EU is losing its influence in 
global arena instead of gaining it.77 With an aim to defend current state of EU military 
cooperation, one may say that military field is similar to any other wide range challenge 
Europe is facing. Geography, national interests, historical and cultural backgrounds, and 
– priorities are so controversial that it is complicated to find common ground and to take 
coordinated well planned effective resource using efforts towards creation of the credible 
military force. 
Also, one may argue that there is no need for common military structures within the EU 
at all. The answer for external military threats is NATO which provides self-defence for 
the EU and EU would do the crisis management in order to support more secure world 
order (Bentinck 2014: 11).78 Such statement has some shortfalls. First of all, NATO 
collective defence does not cover all EU member states. Namely Austria, Cyprus, 
Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden are left out from NATO article 5 operation. Currently 
there is no direct military threat to Austria and Mediterranean member states, because 
they are not bordering with Russia. At the same time Sweden and especially Finland 
should consider the theoretical threat from the East. And Nordic countries have realized 
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it. As evidence to that is the fact that the traditionally neutral country Sweden, has re-
assessed the status of Russian Federation from neutral- to the potentially aggressive 
country. 
Secondly, annexation of Crimea and military support from the Russian Federation to the 
Donetsk and Luhansk separatists has changed security architecture in Europe. The use of 
new type of hybrid warfare has again raised the questions about the need for common 
European military force/European army which is required for demonstrating to the world 
the ability to react quickly to the aggressive actions of neighbouring countries (with 
military involvement included) against any EU Member State which is not able to defend 
itself or/and is not member of NATO.  
The ability to react quickly is additionally boosted by Russia which is regularly 
conducting big scale military control exercises which are also testing the ability of the 
units to move quickly for long distances. It may be suggested that if there is a crises with 
military involvement between any EU member state and Russia, the situation may 
potentially escalate very rapidly. In order to prevent or respond such escalation of crisis, 
EU own military capabilities may play a crucial role. At the same time, CSDP has been 
focussed to the crises taking place abroad. As a result, the procedure of activation and 
agreement on using EUROCORPS and Battle Groups in a case of security or defence 
crisis hitting EU Member States is missing. Consequently, this framework of cooperation 
is likely to fail in a case crises will take place within EU.  
Another domain of the problem is that the current format of the EU Battle Groups is based 
on temporary contributions provided by member states. In case of a real-life crisis and 
activation of NATO article 5 operation, it may occur that EU NATO members will not 
be able to send promised troops to the EU Battle Groups, because they are required to 
keep armed forces in homeland combat ready; at the same time, they need to contribute 
to NATO operation and additionally they should send troops to Battle Groups. In 
conditions of limited and reduced defence budgets in EU member states it is possible that 
member states assess state defence and NATO contribution to have higher priority than 
EU Battle Groups. As a result, it may lead to the loss of international credibility of EU 
military capabilities, because EU is demonstrating to the world that they are not able to 
pool agreed and promised 60,000 troops. 
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In order to overcome such problems of duplication of efforts and resources, the solution 
would be to increase the investments to national and common defence. Winn (2003: 50) 
has assessed it to be unrealistic.79 The reasoning behind it may be that EU military 
cooperation has stayed purely political project and there are no readiness from Member 
States to invest in it enough (Tardy 2015:43 – 45).80  
In the author’s opinion member states see funding but more importantly legal procedure 
of creating and activation the forces, as problematic area. The main obstacle of moving 
towards EU federal army is traditional understanding that National Army/Defence Forces 
is one of the most important pillar of any national state. Due to that the Member States 
efforts made on the military side of CSFP are not aimed towards single European Army 
(Shepherd 2000: 17).81  
As explained, EU member states are not indicating readiness to give up another piece of 
sovereignty. Still, the need for widening military cooperation within the EU is in place. 
In the author’s opinion it is necessary to find new forms of military cooperation. One may 
ask what could be a way ahead for the EU military cooperation. There may be several 
solutions. One could be in developing EU military headquarters and EDA. Also, in order 
to overcome lack of coordination and efforts, EDA should be certification authority for 
the common forces and create white paper European Defence (Major and Mölling 2010: 
22).82 It would clear priorities and goals what is essential in order to be more effective. 
Also it is suggested that dual use capabilities between civil and military parts of CSDP 
and common funding of both components would avoid doubling efforts (Ioannides 2010: 
46-47).83 Alternately, effect of saving resources could be achieved though the 
concentration of specific clusters of military industry to few countries. In addition it 
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would provide autonomy to the EU army (Salmon 2003: 12-13).84 Last but not least, there 
is a need for changing mind- set of post neutral countries, which should switch their 
attitudes from neutral to active stance and start actively to contribute to the development 
of common military capabilities (Shepherd 2003: 55-56).85    
Still, in the author’s opinion it would not solve the problems with hiring and equipping 
personnel and activating units quickly enough. Due to that, the author of the thesis 
proposes an alternate solution. 
The logic of the proposal is following. If member states are not willing to deepen EU 
military cooperation and creation common armed forces/European Army for different 
reasons, but the need for credible rapid reaction unit is in place, the new format of the EU 
military unit could be formed. The difference from the currently existing common armed 
forces is, that personnel hired to the unit, is subordinated directly to the supranational 
institutions. In other words, personnel in this unit is applying into it according to similar 
principles as civilians apply to the EU posts in different institutions. In this way the status 
of hired militaries is as citizens of the EU not as citizen of any member state. Currently, 
in case of a crisis member states which are contributing to the Battle Groups and 
EUROCORPS have to approve the activation of the troops while the new format could 
be activated quicker. Also, currently any participating nation may enforce different 
caveats for the use of their troops, which makes it challenging for the commanders to plan 
and lead the units consisting of national contributions. New type of units would have 
synchronized rules for all troops without exceptions.  
In order to respond to the threats of member states that EU supranational institutions could 
become too strong and in case they have their own military troops, they may endanger 
the sovereignty of member states, the size of described hypothetical unit would stay on 
the same scale as the currently existing Battle Groups. It is ca 1,500 troops. Except 
Luxembourg, all of EU countries have a bigger force than that. 
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The benefit of such format of military cooperation is the time gained. If in any region of 
the EU the crisis would start to develop, this unit could be very quickly deployed to the 
area. The signal to the global audience is that EU is capable to react rapidly. The unit is 
small enough not to endanger the host nation and most importantly, the use of such unit 
would provide extra time for the EU Member States to define the appropriate measures 
and to agree upon the use of larger military contingencies in order to fulfil solidarity 
clause taken with Treaties. Even if the follow up force will be in the framework of NATO, 
the initial entry force would come from the EU. 
There is a good starting platform for starting the unit because C2 and logistic elements 
already exist and common military culture is created through Battle Groups cooperation. 
The main challenges to be solved are related to legal bases of the unit and to its use. The 
funding could be solved with the use of EU budget with civil control provided by the 
European Parliament. The command line has to be established from the strategical level 
down to the tactical one. If political will is present, all of these fields could be covered.  
To sum it up, it could be said that the current format of EU military cooperation belongs 
to the modern forms of military cooperation seen in the framework of international 
organisations. From the creation in 1990´s the EU has achieved significant success and 
has managed to create a functioning system tested in real life operations in different crises 
areas. Still, the cooperation suffers from different shortfalls which are rooted in the lack 
of political will to make EU military cooperation effective. But new geopolitical situation 
provides new challenges. In the author’s opinion there is the need for reforming the 
current military cooperation in order to fulfil obligations taken by member states and to 
guarantee credibility of the EU in international arena. Last but not least, reform is needed 
for deterring hypothetical opponents. If demonstrated ability to react rapidly it may keep 
away armed confrontations in the future.  
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3. QUANTITATIVE ANALYZE ON EU OFFICIAL 
DOCUMENTATION REGARDING COMMON SECURITY 
AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP) 
As seen in previous chapter, there are numerous reasons for deepening military 
cooperation within EU. In this chapter overview about conducted survey of the EU 
official documentation and its results is given. The aim of studying EU official 
documentation was to find an answer for following study questions: 
- Has the changing security situation within the EU and its neighbourhood caused 
the rise of the number of documents concerning the CSDP?  
- Does the most used CSDP related official terminology, covered by the EU official 
documentation, indicate support to the idea of deepening military cooperation 
and/or creating Common Armed Forces/European Army? 
In order to study it, quantitative analyse of EU official documents represented in web-
based public database EUR Lex was conducted.86 After sorting out CSDP related 
documents, they were analysed with the use of EU official terminology represented in 
EUROVOC web-site were carried out.87 
The assumption was that if the number of documents concerning CSDP military part is 
raised, it may indicate that progress on a field of widening cooperation at the common 
armed forces is made and it may be still ongoing. At the same time, it needs to be noticed, 
how these documents are divided between CSDP security- and defence domains. Big 
and/or increasing number of CSDP documents is not necessarily alluding to EU 
movement towards deepening military cooperation, because security portion of the CSDP 
is covering additionally aspects of internal security and guarding EU external borders. 
Still, as far as current thesis concentrating to the military portion of the CSDP, the main 
focus is on military issues.  
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Before moving to explanation of methodology, characteristics of collected data and the 
outcomes of the survey some basics which have influenced the procedure of survey have 
to be explained.  
Firstly, it is important to keep in mind the mechanism of EU decision making procedure. 
From the point of ordinary legislative procedure the documents represented in Eur Lex 
are having different weight. The Council of the European Union, European Commission 
and European Parliament are having bigger importance while written questions to the EU 
institutions by the Members of European Parliament (MEPs) cannot be taken as 
significant documents from the point of EU legislative activities and policy making. Still, 
author of the thesis kept MEPs questions also within the database of processed 
documents. Justification is that author was looking for indirect indications of 
hypothetically progressing towards deeper common military cooperation or common 
armed forces. The topics covered by the MEPs as representatives of national electorates 
may indicate interest to the surveyed field of CSDP.  From the point of interpreting the 
results conducted document survey functioning of ordinary legislative procedure has to 
be explained. In principle this procedure is providing equal opportunities to the citizens, 
Member States and EU institutions to come up with legislative initiatives on all possible 
fields of functioning of the EU. Ordinary legislative procedure origins from codecision 
procedure which was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty 1992 and extended by the 
Amsterdam Treaty 1999. The Treaty of Lisbon named it to ordinary legislative procedure 
based on TFEU Article 289. Initiatives are handled by European Commission which 
prepares draft legislative proposals for the European Parliament. 
Secondly, the essence of conducted documents analyse has to be clarified. In addition to 
the headlines of official documents, the search engine in Eur Lex environment provides 
opportunity to search within all range of documents. In this way search results normally 
included the short explanation of the document. It stated by which EU institution 
documents are initiated, what kind of legislative acts they are. Also what is the main idea 
of the document? In this way, author had change to understand the content of the 
documents. The difference was with around 200 written questions of MEPs. Response of 
the search engine did not explain the subjects of the questions. For these documents author 
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did additional search and went through full original documents in order to make clear into 
which established domain certain documents are belonging to.  
3.1 Methodology 
In order to conduct the analyses, the proper and trustful sources had to be identified, range 
of studied documentation decided and principles of analysis set up. Reasoning and 
description of conducted procedure, also limitations of survey are following.  
EU has done some efforts in order to make its documentation available for the citizens. 
For this purpose, internet based environment EUR Lex is created. It includes documents 
from EU institutions like Council of the European Union, European Parliament and its 
Committees, European Commission etc. These institutions are playing significant role in 
setting EU goals and development targets and their actions are influencing EU citizens’ 
daily life. From this point of view EUR Lex can be considered as valuable and trustful 
source of documentation. Furthermore, as stated on its home-page, it includes “EU law 
and other public EU documents, authentic electronic Official Journal of the EU – in 24 
languages.” It means that Eur Lex environment is playing harmonizing role of EU 
documentation while all citizens can have access to the content of documents in all EU 
official languages. 
EUR Lex search engine provides different options for searches. With the purpose to 
simplify searching process and to harmonize terminology in all official EU languages 
EUROVOC terms-vocabulary has been created and linked to the EUR-Lex environment. 
Author used the option which has grouped official terms to the bigger domains in 
functioning of the EU. Defence can be found under the 08 International relations as sub 
group 0821. As it can be seen, the area of “defence” includes 156 words and expressions 
officially used in EU documentation (Appendix 1). 
The next step was to select from the list the terms which are characterising CSDP as 
Policy. The words and expressions which are on tactical level and not covering general 
meaning of the field of common defence in military means were left out. As a result, from 
initial 156 words 25 were selected as valid for further searches (Appendix 2). It narrowed 
the focus of EUR Lex searches. 
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Another dimension to be decided was timeframes for searches. As far as Russia’s military 
intervention in Ukraine and annexation of the Crimea took place in 2014 – 2015, this is 
the timeframe which theoretically could indicate change of dynamics on EU 
documentation concerning to the military domain. As far as longer period for comparison 
was needed and the creation of current set-up of CSDP took place in 2009 when Lisbon 
Treaty was enforced, the timeframe for searches was set as from 01.01.2009 till 
31.12.2015. 
After setting up such search parameters, all of selected 25 words and expressions were 
used for searching. Initial number of responses was 2992. This figure was not number of 
separate original documents. Part of the documents were given repeatedly as a response 
for different searches. After filtering out the files which responded to different search 
words/expressions the number went down to 2290. The authors of the documents were 
Members of the European Parliament; Council of the European Union; High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy; European Commission and 
its Committees; European Parliaments and its Committees; Court of Justice of the 
European Union, Court of Auditors of the European Union and EU Member States. 
After downloading the metadata of original 2290 documents to the single database, they 
had to be grouped in order to divide their topics between CSDP different domains. For 
this purpose, analyse of all documents had to be conducted. It included creation of coding 
system and coding of all documents. For the coding, following groups were created: 
- Defence: Documents which are directly linked to the military defence of the 
Member States; 
- EU Security: protection of information, neighbouring countries activities, 
Frontex, usage and development of underwater and air drones, control over 
firearms, combating terrorism, personal protective equipment of the citizens, 
harmonizing legislative acts related to the explosives and pyrotechnic articles for 
civil use; Schengen Borders Code; disarmament and arms control; restrictive 
measures against certain persons and entities; fighting illegal trafficking of 
firearms and its components;  
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- International affairs: These documents are dealing with trade, diplomatic and 
economic cooperation, free movement of people, sanctions against people and 
entities, related to the events taking place worldwide. All of these documents are 
having text which includes also one or few words or expressions relating them to 
the search words; 
- Military abroad: These documents are covering EU military operations in frames 
of CSDP (outside from the territory of the EU);  
- Security abroad: CSDP includes components of non-military operations. They can 
be law enforcement-, monitoring-, police- or border guard missions. Documents 
in this group are linked to these missions;  
- Other: Documents which are dealing with other aspects of the functioning of the 
EU. They are not linked to any of domains directly related to the CSDP.  
Group “Other” with 984 responses was excluded from later studies because it did not 
have direct links to the Military and Security aspects of the CSDP. As a result the number 
of processed documents came down to the 1257. This was the final number of documents 
which was studied more closely. Before providing the outcomes of survey, the technical 
procedure of conducted searches step by step is explained.  
3.2 Technical process of EUR-Lex searches 
At EUR-Lex home page “advanced search” option was used. Earlier chosen search words 
and abbreviations (Annex 2) were entered one by one to the first section “Search by text” 
in-between of quotation marks. The search included searching “In title” and “In text”. 
This procedure provides responses of exact phrases and helps to keep searches focussed. 
“AND”, “OR”, “NOT” conditionals were not used. Document reference and sector 
“Author of the document” were left by default to “All”. CELEX number was left blank. 
Search parameters were set to the sector “Search by date”. From drop down menu named 
“Type of date” option “Date of document” was selected. Date range was set to 01.01.2009 
- 31.12.2015.  
Finally, with sector “Published in the Official Journal” two different approaches were 
used. During initial searches this part of the set-up was left blank. Later on extra searches 
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had to be completed, because description of almost 200 files was limited to the “Written 
questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given by a European 
Union institution” without specifying the content of these questions. To clarify it, all 
parameters were set exactly as it was explained above with the exception that to the sector 
“Published in the Official Journal” sub-part “OJ series” “C – information and notices” or 
“CE - supplement E” was chosen; to the field “Number” number of the Official Journal 
entered and the year of specific Member of Parliament question was entered. In this way 
it was possible to see original documents and to complete the coding of the created 
database.  
For the analyses the Microsoft Excel 2013 was used.  
During the processing collected data, additional need for extra coding raised. Initially 
there was a mess with describing authors of the documents. The list of authors and the 
essence of documents included: Members of the European Parliament and answers by a 
European Union institutions; Council Regulations; Directives; Agreements; Commission 
recommendations; Commission reports to the European Parliament and to the Council of 
the European Union; Positions of the Council of the European Union; Decisions of the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy; Opinions of the 
European Economic and Social Committee on the European Civic Service; Common 
Military Lists of the European Union; Annual Reports of the Council of the European 
Union; European Parliaments and its Committees resolutions; colegislative 
communication between European Commission and European Parliament; Judgements 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union. As demonstrated in Table 1 the number of 
authors went down to 12.  
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Table 1. Coding key by the author of the documents  
Name Remarks 
European Union International agreements signed by the EU in 
frames of CFSP 
EU Member States Agreements dealing with EU Treaties and 
International agreements between Member 
States with other States 
Council of the European Union  
Council of the European Union, 
European Parliament 
Ordinary legislative procedure. Documents 
initiated by the Council of the European Union 
European Parliament, Council 
of the European Union 
Ordinary legislative procedure. Documents 
initiated by the European Parliament 
European Parliament  
European Commission  
European Commission, High 
Representative of the Union 
Ordinary legislative procedure. Documents 
initiated by the European Commission 
High Representative of the 
Union 
 
High Representative of the 
Union, European Commission 
Ordinary legislative procedure. Documents 
initiated by the High Representative of the 
Union 
Court of Justice Opinions and judgements 
European Court of Auditors Reports on EU missions in frameworks of 
CSDP 
 
3.3 Characteristics of the collected data. Findings 
As described before, the collected documents were divided into 6 different domains. Next, 
closer look to the content of the coded domains without “Other” and the findings are 
provided. 
Defence: 100 responses. Documents which are directly linked to the military defence of 
Member States and movement of military equipment within EU; 
EU Security: 176 responses. Documents addressing terrorism, organized crime, arms 
control, data protection, sanctions against individuals and entities, border guard, 
Schengen Borders Code, civil use of pyrotechnics, arms and explosives, movement of 
military goods, military and security personnel, judicial cooperation, EU military industry 
and the use of modern technologies, civil defence, trafficking of weapons and people, 
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security of public services, migration crisis, cyber-crimes and – defence, harmonisation 
of legislation;  
Military abroad. 62 responses. Covering EU military operations in Atalanta Somalia, 
Mali, Lebanon, Libya, Central African Republic;  
Security abroad: 53 responses. Content of these documents is related to the EU security 
missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Kosovo, 
Libya, Mali, Palestine, Republic of Niger and Ukraine; 
International affairs: 914 responses. These documents are dealing with trade, diplomatic 
and economic cooperation, free movement of people, sanctions against people and 
entities, related to the events taking place in (Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma, Central 
African Republic, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
Guinea, Iran, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Republic of Guinea-Bissau, South Sudan, Sudan, 
Syria, and Ukraine). EULEX missions (Rule of Law) abroad. EU Monitoring Missions 
(Georgia). Maritime safety. European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership 
Program working papers. Pre-accession reports about Balkan countries. Court of Justice 
judgements. 
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In order to figure out how the dynamics have changed in chosen five domains Diagram 
1 provides general overview by quarters. As seen, “International affairs” has been 
dominating over other surveyed domains. Also it can be noticed that the trend line on 
“International affairs” has been constantly increasing. While counting military and 
security domains within EU and abroad together, security aspects of the EU have had 
more attention. 2009 - 2015 number of security related documents was 219 and defence 
related documents 162. The biggest number of security and defence documents was in 
2013 and 2014. In 2015 the number went down again to the pre-crisis level. 
Taken by the domains, slight fluctuations can be observed, but average level remained 
approximately the same. For the EU security related documents one peak was on a fourth 
quarter of the 2012 while for the military abroad and defence domains the peak was the 
end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014. Still, while taking into the consideration the 
beginning of Crimean crisis, suggested rapid rise of number on defence related documents 
did not occur. 
 
 
Diagram 1. Trends on the numbers of documents 2009 – 2015 by domains. 
  
46 
 
From Diagram 2 domain “International relations” is left out. In a chart number of 
documents by quarters is represented. Also diagram indicates the balance between 
domains. Throughout the period domain “EU security” has been given the most of the 
documents. Despite of that, the quarterly figures of this domain remains between 10 
documents in 2009 and 36 documents in 2014, which cannot be assessed to be significant 
number.  
According to the diagram, the trend on the numbers of military concerned documents 
stayed stable. Still, first quarter of 2014 indicated a raise of defence related documents 
from three to thirteen. On the other hand, the same figure went down again on second 
quarter 2014 to one document and stayed stable till the end of surveyed period.  
 
Diagram 2. Trends on the numbers of documents 2009 – 2015 by domains (with 
International affairs excluded). 
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Consequently it can be said, that in accordance to the data provided in Diagram 1 and 
Diagram 2 ongoing crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s aggressive foreign politics did not 
influence EU stance towards Common Military Defence from the aspect of EU public 
documentation. As far as domain “EU security” remained also at the same level, the 
refugees-crises and massive illegal immigration to the EU have had limited impact to the 
documentation. 
Diagrams 3 and 4 are giving information from the point of originating 
authority/institution of surveyed documents. Diagram 3 is indicating additionally the 
initiators of the documents created in frames of ordinary legislative procedure with 
involvement of several EU institutions. The main contributors of documents were Council 
of the European Union (51%); European Commission (19%) and European Parliament 
(21%). European Parliament was contributing in different context: as an institution in 
general; as MEP´s asking the questions from different EU institutions and as different EP 
working groups and -commissions. 
 
Diagram 3. Percentage of the created documents by author. 
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Diagram 4 adds in addition to the authors also time factor. From the three main 
contributors, the portion of European Commission remains roughly to the same level 
throughout surveyed period. Significantly, the beginning of Ukraine crises in 2014 is 
reflected in EU official documents creation with a raise of documents originated by the 
Council of the European Union from 88 documents in 2013 to 136 in 2014 (raise ca 55%). 
In 2015 this number went down to 125 documents, which is still higher than it had been 
before Ukraine crisis. As far as Council of the European Union is representing Member 
States, it may be interpreted as raise of public intergovernmental information exchange.  
Another interesting point is, that in 2015 number of surveyed documents created by the 
European Parliament went down from 76 documents in 2014 to 8 documents in 2015 
(drop ca 89 %). Due to the fact that there is no comparison with a year 2016, it cannot be 
said if it was just one year anomaly or it was the beginning of trend that sensitive topic of 
common security and defence is not discussed in European Parliament and it is left for 
the Member States in format of Council of the European Union. 
 
Diagram 4. Number of documents by the authors and years 
 
49 
 
In the context of current thesis the most important domains out from six are “Defence”, 
“EU Security”, “Security abroad” and “Military abroad”. Table 2 provides information 
about the correlations between these domains. It appears that observed domains are 
interrelated. Strong correlation can be observed between “Defence” and “EU security” 
and “Military abroad” with “EU security”. The rest of correlations remain at the moderate 
level while the only weak correlation between different domains appears between “EU 
security” and “Security abroad”. It means that if number of documents in certain period 
of time is raising in one domain, it causes also increase in number of documents in 
positively correlated domains. In this specific case the only difference is the moderate 
correlation between “Defence” and “Security abroad”. If number of documents in one of 
them is raising, it is likely to cause the reduction in number of documents in other domain. 
Table 2. Correlations between domains 
  EU security Military abroad Security abroad 
Defence 0,40057493 0,248125669 -0,239049625 
EU security   0,350696719 0,066160597 
Military abroad     0,266494067 
 
The last component of authors´ interest concerned to the change of official terminology 
within domain in all surveyed documents and in domain “Defence” as directly linked to 
the EU common armed forces and to the idea of creation European Army. Table 3 
provides information in timeframes before Ukraine crises (2009 – 2013) and Table 4 
explains the use of   EUROVOC descriptors during the crises (2014-2015). Both tables 
are providing 20 most used terms. 
While comparing the use of official terminology in all processed documents, it can be 
concluded that most of the used terms remained the same. The difference is that in 2014 
– 2015 terms Ukraine, Russia, territorial dispute and political reform appeared to the 
documentation. If counted together, in this period these terms gave the biggest share of 
surveyed documents. Analyses indicated, that official public documents touching Ukraine 
crisis are not covering CSDP or EU common armed forces in this context. 
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At the same time in domain “Defence” only minor change in terminology can be 
observed. Top 20 of most used terms 2014-2015 included only 50 documents, which is 
not enough for making conclusions about the possible change of use of terms. Still, new 
terms to highlight in top 20 are: arms trade and European Defence Agency.  
Table 3. Most used EUROVOC descriptors 2009 – 2013. From all documents and from 
domain “Defence” 
EUROVOC descriptor 
Total no of 
documents 
2009-2013 
EUROVOC 
descriptor 
No of 
documents 
2009-2013 
(Defence) 
international sanctions 100 military equipment 17 
economic sanctions 91 CFSP 11 
human rights 87 defence expenditure 8 
Member of the European 
Parliament 74 export monitoring 8 
written question 74 armed forces 7 
CFSP 69 European security 6 
European Parliament 47 
Member of the 
European Parliament 6 
European neighbourhood 
policy 45 
research and 
development 6 
the EU's international role 41 technology 6 
EU Member State 40 United States 6 
terrorism 40 written question 6 
cooperation policy 37 arms control 5 
natural person 37 code of conduct 5 
European Commission 36 data protection 5 
trade restriction 35 EU Member State 5 
job vacancy 34 civil defence 4 
accession criteria 32 defence policy 4 
military equipment 32 directory 4 
administrator 31 
EU-NATO 
cooperation 4 
servant (EU) 31 
European defence 
policy 4 
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Table 4. Most used EUROVOC descriptors 2014 – 2015. From all documents and from 
domain “Defence” 
EUROVOC descriptor 
Total no of 
documents 
2014-2015 
EUROVOC descriptor 
No of 
documents 
2014-2015 
(Defence) 
international sanctions 72 military equipment 6 
economic sanctions 65 export monitoring 4 
Member of the European 
Parliament 45 technology 4 
written question 45 
Member of the European 
Parliament 3 
Ukraine 39 written question 3 
human rights 38 arms trade 2 
European neighbourhood 
policy 37 CFSP 2 
terrorism 31 defence policy 2 
administrator 30 directory 2 
competition (EU) 26 EC conformity marking 2 
Russia 25 
European Defence 
Agency 2 
territorial dispute 22 European standard 2 
corruption 21 free movement of goods 2 
political reform 21 information transfer 2 
visa policy 20 interpretation of the law 2 
deportation 19 intra-EU trade 2 
natural person 19 marketing standard 2 
EU military mission 18 protective equipment 2 
job vacancy 18 
public awareness 
campaign 2 
trade restriction 18 single market 2 
 
To sum up, the results of conducted quantitative analyse of the published EU official 
defence related documents, it may be concluded that comparison of pre-crisis (2009 – 
2013) and crisis time (2014 – 2015) periods do not indicate remarkable change the 
dynamics of document creation and the change in use of official EUROVOC terms. The 
number of published documents has stayed relatively stable with a trend of slight increase. 
There can raise in number of CSDP related documents observed in the end of 2013 and 
first half of 2014, but in 2015 the number went down to pre-crisis level.  
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Another aspect it that from the point of initiator of documents, during the crisis the 
importance of the Council of the European Union increased while in 2015 number of 
CSDP related documents initiated by the European Parliament fell rapidly. The balance 
between documents related to the security and defence aspects of the CSDP has been for 
security domain. Annual figures indicate exceptions in 2009 and 2013 then there were 
few more defence- than security related documents  
3.4 Discussion 
In a phase of preparation to the survey, the authors´ assumption was that as outcome the 
survey provides some indications of having impact from events taking place in Ukraine, 
EU confrontation with Russia and massive scale illegal immigration to the EU. It would 
have meant that number of public documents concerning to the security and defence 
components of CSDP demonstrated rapid raise in dynamics. Conducted survey did not 
support this expectation.  Also, unexpectedly the use of terminology did not change due 
to the changing security environment. Even though the topic of Ukraine, Russia, EU 
relations appeared to the documentation, it was not involving military aspect of the CSDP. 
There may be few explanations to it. It may be suggested that, despite to the declarative 
handover of CSDP to the EU jurisdiction, in a case of real life emergencies EU institutions 
are not having such influence in the field of security and defence, while intergovernmental 
exchange of information is likely to have more significant role. Another option is that 
respective EU official documentation exist but it is classified due to its sensitive character. 
In both described cases such kind of information exchange is not visible for regular 
citizens, which may explain the outcomes of current survey.   
Described model has also some limitations. Despite to the fact that documents data 
downloaded from Eur Lex environment included list of used descriptors and separate field 
explaining essence of the documents, it is not enough to conduct deeper analyse. For this 
purpose another methodology has to be set up. 
Another limitation is related to the initiators of the published documents. Although 
separately Members of the European Parliament are not having influence over decision 
making, author took calculated risk and left into the selected data also written questions 
of MEPs to the EU institutions and the answers to them. This form of information 
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exchange reflects the possible change in MEPs interest to the CSDP and at the same time 
EU institutions official statements about CSDP are represented. Additionally, as long as 
number of directly defence- and common armed forces related documents remained 
modest, author did not conduct deep analyses from the aspect of ordinary legislative 
procedure. While keeping MEP´s questions included, it provided wider overview about 
the public discourse concerning to the surveyed topic. 
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CONCLUSION 
The current thesis has evaluated the status of the European Union military cooperation in 
the framework of Common Security and Defence policy. Specifically the focus was on 
the possibility of creation of European Common Armed Forces/European Army as 
permanent military force in the framework of CSDP as the next step of federalization. 
The author finds there are several reasons why current formats of cooperation should be 
extended and made more efficient. Two main components of the thesis were set up.  
Firstly, from the point of theorists and from the practical aspects, the current state of EU 
military cooperation was explained and assessed. The aim of this supportive part of the 
thesis was to provide background information about CSDP. Secondly, survey of the EU 
official publicly available documentation was conducted with the aim to find out if due 
to the worsening security situation within the EU and its neighbourhood the number of 
CSDP related documents has changed significantly. The idea of conducting such a survey 
originates from the public discourse about the possible need to create the European Army. 
Several high level EU and member states’ officials have expressed their opinions for and 
against this idea. The author’s assumption was that if such an exchange of thoughts is 
taking place publicly, the same tendency may occur also in the EU public official 
documentation. Even though the changing dynamics within EU official documentation 
cannot be interpreted as a direct proof of progressing towards deepening cooperation 
between member states, it may be considered as indirect evidence of the existence of 
political will on the EU level. 
Based on the theoretical overview it can be concluded that there is no common 
understanding among scholars, about the reasoning, the nature and significance of the 
creation and evolution of CSDP with its military component included. According to 
different authors, the main obstacles for moving further are: lack of political will to make 
military aspect of CSDP act effectively; lack of coordination between participating 
member states; insufficient availability of critical assets and unequal contribution to the 
defense. In addition, the diversity of national interests and priorities makes it challenging 
to put current forms of cooperation to work more efficiently. Also scholars agree that 
there are no significant indications of having plans for deepening military cooperation or 
progressing towards a standing European Army.  
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Despite the criticism from scholars, one cannot deny the fact that progress on the field of 
common defence and common armed forces is made. Creation of EU institutions like 
European Union Military Staff, European Defence Agency, EUROCORPS and EU Battle 
Groups have created the basis for developing more complex and wide-range forms of 
military cooperation. Also common military culture is created and such cooperation is 
constantly ongoing on real life operations overseas and in the format of Battle Groups. It 
provides a theoretical platform for further enlargement of military cooperation. 
The main component of the thesis was the presentation of the conducted document 
analyses. With the purpose to have a closer look at the security and defence aspects of the 
CSDP, a survey of the EU official publicly available documentation was accomplished. 
It covered timeframes 2009 – 2015 and included 2290 original documents published in 
Eur Lex web-database. As the main outcome, the analyses did not indicate a significant 
change of dynamics throughout the surveyed period. There was a raise in the number 
documents in the end of 2013 and the first half of 2014, but in 2015 the number went 
down almost to the pre-crisis level. 
From this it can be concluded that the changing security environment in the EU and its 
neighborhood has not caused a significant raise in the numbers of the topic related 
documents. The analysis of the use of official terms indicated that most of the used terms 
remained the same. The difference is that in 2014 – 2015 terms “Ukraine”, “Russia”, 
“territorial dispute” and “political reform” appeared to the documentation. At the same 
time it is important to note that the documents consisting these terms, belonged to the 
domain “International affairs” and were not linked to the military aspect of the CSDP. 
In the author’s opinion, possible explanations to such outcomes of the survey could be 
related to the domination of the intergovernmentalism and/or to the fact that security and 
defence, as sensitive domains of the functioning of the EU and its member states, is kept 
classified by the EU institutions and EU member states. The idea of ruling 
intergovernmentalism is supported by the practice used during the Greek financial crisis. 
Solutions were created by the more influential and capable member states and the role of 
EU institutions remained modest. Parallely, it could be suggested that the aspects of 
military cooperation largely depend on Germany, France, UK and Poland and they are 
not eager to make the details publicly known. 
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Still, in the author’s personal opinion in order to proceed with the idea of common armed 
forces, at first the idea has to be “sold” to the internal electorates in EU member states. 
Which means that conclusions made on the results of analyses of public EU 
documentations are likely to reflect the real situation in short term perspective. In long 
term there is the possibility that ideas, plans and agreements concerning the European 
Army, which are currently classified, will appear to public discourse and documentation 
in the future. 
Based on conclusions of the conducted survey and academic discourse, it can be summed 
up that despite some progress made in the framework of CSDP, it is not likely that in the 
near future there will be any significant progress made towards creation of common 
armed forces/European army. 
While taking into consideration the federalization process of the EU; progress made in 
the framework of CSDP; increased power of supranational institutions; changed security 
architecture of the continental Europe and raised speculations about the need to introduce 
EU federal armed forces, further studies about the EU common military co-operation and 
perspectives of having the European Army are required. Albeit current study of EU 
official documentation is not indicating a significant change in creation of the European 
Army, it would be worthwhile to study further the changes in public rhetoric in the future.  
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APPENDICES 
 APPENDIX 1 
EUROVOC full list of Official Defence related vocabulary 
TERMS (PT-NPT) ALTERNATE TERMS (PT-NPT) ALTERNATE 
air base military base chemical weapon   
aircraft carrier   civilian personnel   
air force   combat aircraft fighter aircraft 
alternative service   combat helicopter   
anti-missile defence   combat plane fighter aircraft 
anti-missile missile anti-missile defence combat vehicle   
anti-personnel landmine anti-personnel weapon conscientious objection   
anti-personnel mine anti-personnel weapon conscientious objector 
conscientious 
objection 
anti-personnel weapon   conventional weapon   
anti-satellite system space-based weapons defence budget   
APL anti-personnel weapon defence expenditure   
armed forces   defence policy   
armed services armed forces defence programme defence policy 
armoured vehicle combat vehicle defence statistics   
arms military equipment department of intelligence secret service 
arms delivery arms supply desertion military discipline 
arms industry   deterrent   
arms policy   deterrent force deterrent 
arms sales arms trade Echelon espionage 
arms supply   espionage   
arms trade   
European armaments 
cooperation 
European arms 
policy 
arms trafficking arms trade European arms policy   
artillery conventional weapon European defence policy   
art of war military science failure to report for duty   
atom bomb nuclear weapon fighter aircraft   
atomic bomb nuclear weapon fighter plane fighter aircraft 
atomic weapon nuclear weapon firearms and munitions   
bacteriological weapon biological weapon first-strike capacity deterrent 
ballistic missile   fleet air arm warships 
banned weapon prohibited weapon forces abroad   
battle fleet warships foreign base military base 
battleship warships ground forces land forces 
biological weapon   guided missile   
bomber   harmonisation of weapons   
border police paramilitary force harmonization of weapons 
harmonisation of 
weapons 
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TERMS (PT-NPT) ALTERNATE TERMS (PT-NPT) ALTERNATE 
hydrogen bomb nuclear weapon naval base military base 
incendiary weapon   navy   
intercontinental missile   neutron bomb nuclear weapon 
IRBM ballistic missile non-lethal weapon   
JOAC European arms policy nuclear bomb nuclear weapon 
Joint Organisation for 
Armaments Cooperation European arms policy nuclear device nuclear weapon 
land forces   nuclear missile missile 
land mine anti-personnel weapon nuclear weapon   
laser weapon   OCCAR 
European arms 
policy 
legion armed forces paramilitary force   
martial law military law professional army   
mercenary   prohibited weapon   
military armed forces rapid reaction force   
military adviser forces abroad rearmament   
military aeronautics military aircraft reserve army   
military aircraft   Royal Air Force air force 
military base   Royal Navy navy 
military base abroad military base scout plane military aircraft 
military budget defence budget SDI strategic defence 
military discipline   secret service   
military equipment   security forces paramilitary force 
military expenditure defence expenditure space-based weapons   
military law   star wars strategic defence 
military manoeuvres   stationing of forces   
military material military equipment stockpiling of weapons   
military personnel   strategic defence   
military police paramilitary force Strategic Defence Initiative strategic defence 
military programme defence policy 
strategic nuclear arms 
system 
strategic nuclear 
weapon 
military science   strategic nuclear weapon   
military secret   submarine   
military service national service 
subsurface-to-surface 
missile guided missile 
military training   surface-to-surface missile guided missile 
militia armed forces tactical nuclear weapon   
MIRV guided missile tactical weapon 
tactical nuclear 
weapon 
missile   tank combat vehicle 
multiple independently 
targetable re-entry vehicle guided missile TNW 
tactical nuclear 
weapon 
napalm incendiary weapon troop transport plane military aircraft 
national defence defence policy voluntary military service   
national service   volunteer 
voluntary military 
service 
naval air forces warships war aviation military aircraft 
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TERMS (PT-NPT) ALTERNATE 
war material military equipment 
warships   
weapon military equipment 
weapon of mass 
destruction   
women's military service   
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APPENDIX 2 
EUROVOC selected list of Official Defence related vocabulary 
TERMS (PT-NPT) ALTERNATE 
armed forces   
armed services armed forces 
arms policy   
defence budget   
defence expenditure   
defence policy   
defence programme defence policy 
European armaments cooperation European arms policy 
European arms policy   
European defence policy   
ground forces land forces 
land forces   
military budget defence budget 
military expenditure defence expenditure 
military law   
military programme defence policy 
military service national service 
military training   
national defence defence policy 
national service   
OCCAR European arms policy 
professional army   
rapid reaction force   
rearmament   
strategic defence   
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ÜHTNE JULGEOLEKU- JA KAITSEPOLIITIKA NING ÜHISRELVAJÕUD/ 
EUROOPA ARMEE EUROOPA LIIDU AMETLIKUS 
DOKUMENTATSIOONIS 2009 – 2015 
Peeter Einbaum 
Kokkuvõte 
Alates Euroopa ühenduste loomisest 1950´ndatel aastatel, on võimaliku riikide ühiskaitse 
teema mitut puhku esile kerkinud. Altiero Spinelli nägi juba toona ühiseid relvajõude 
rahvusülese eraldiseisva organisatsioonina, mis koosnenuks rahvuste baasil loodud 
väeüksustes ning omanuks eraldiseisvat rahastust (Salmon 2003: 22).88 Koos Euroopa 
Kaitseühenduse ebaõnnestumisega 1954 anti käest esimene võimalus ühisrelvajõudude 
loomiseks. 
Idee kerkis esile uuesti 1990´ndatel, kui Jugoslaavias puhkes sõda. Sel ajal oli EL 
liikmeriikidel kokku enam kui 2,000 000 sõdurit, kuid puudus raamistik nende ühiseks 
kasutamiseks (Major and Mölling 2010: 12).89 Sellest alates on Euroopa Ühiskaitse idee 
teinud läbi märkimisväärse arengu. Seda nii läbi raamlepingutega võetud 
solidaarsuskohustuse, Petersberg´i ülesannete kui ka reaalselt EL poolt läbi viidud 
sõjaliste operatsioonide. Oluline on märkida, et EL liikmesriigid on läbi Euroopa Välis- 
ja Julgeoleku poliitika formaadi delegeerinud osaliselt EL tasandile ka kaitse- ja 
julgeoleku valdkonna, mida traditsiooniliselt on peetud riikide suveräänsuse alustalaks 
ning osaks „kõrgpoliitikast“. 
Magistritöö autor näeb täiendavat vajadust laiendada olemasolevat sõjalise koostöö 
formaati. Selle põhjuseks on muutunud julgeoleku arhitektuur Euroopas tervikuna, esile 
kerkinud uued asümmeetrilised ohud terrorismi näol ning ka käimasolev rändekriis. 
Täiendavaks ajendiks võib pidada teatavat ebakindlust, mis on seotud USA, kui NATO 
suurima reaalse sõjalise jõu, võimaliku poliitikamuutusega ning raskuspunkti võimaliku 
kandumisega Indo Hiina regiooni tasakaalustamaks Hiina kasvavat ekspansiivset 
ambitsiooni. Hetkel käimasolevate USA presidendivalimiste kampaania lõpptulemina ei 
                                                          
88 Salmon, T-C. (2003), Toward a European army: a military power in the making?, Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner. 2003. 
89 Major, C. and Mölling, C. (2010), EU Military capabilities – some European troops, but not yet a 
European Army. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. EU Crisis Management: Institutions and 
Capabilities in the Making, Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., pp. 11 – 28. 
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ole välistatud riigi poliitika ülalmainitud suunamuutus. Nii on väidetud, et USA sõjaline 
kohalolek Euroopas ei ole vääramatult garanteeritud.90  
Lisaks ülalmainitud põhjustele lisab ühiste relvajõudude efektiivsuse tõstmiseks vajadust 
Vene Föderatsiooni agressiivne käitumine. Kui Vene Föderatsioon on demonstreerinud 
maailmale läbi õppuste ja reaalse sõjalise sekkumise, oma võimet kiiresti suuri 
väeüksuseid pikkade vahemaade taha liigutada, siis samaaegselt on EL näidanud 
avalikkusele oma aeglast otsuseprotsessi. Nii on olnud reageerimine Kreeka võlakriisile 
ja ka rändekriisile aeglane ning ebaefektiivne. Samaaegselt nimetatud ebaefektiivsusele 
on EL seadnud endale eesmärgiks saada usaldusväärseks rahu tagajaks (ka sõjaliste 
meetmetega) globaalses mastaabis. Selles valguses oleks vaja tõsta ühisrelvajõudude 
varustatust ning erinevaid võimekusi ning lihtsustada nende esmast rakendamist ka kriisi 
puhkemisel EL territooriumil. Sarnast loogikat on oma ettepanekutes esitanud ka rida 
kõrgeid EL ja ka liikmesriikide ametnikke, eesotsas Euroopa Komisjoni Presidendi Jean 
Claude Juncker´iga, kes tõstatas avalikkuses vajaduse luua Euroopa armee.   
Võttes aluseks kirjeldatud taustinformatsiooni, seadis magistritöö autor eesmärgi uurida 
lähemalt senist EL koostööd Ühtse Kaitse- ja Julgeolekupoliitika raames. Lisaks sellele 
viidi läbi EL ametlike avalikult kättesaadavate dokumentide analüüs, eesmärgiga 
tuvastada võimalik dünaamika muutus dokumentides, mis on seotud Ühtse Kaitse- ja 
Julgeolekupoliitikaga perioodil 2009 - 2015. Samuti uuriti, kuidas on muutunud 
dokumentides kasutatav ametlik terminoloogia eelkõige Ukraina kriisi mõjul. 
Iseloomustamaks senist sõjalise koostöö arengut EL Ühtse Kaitse- ja Julgeolekupoliitika 
raames, on võimalik esile tuua mitmeid aspekte. Positiivsena arenguna võib nimetada 
juriidilise raamistiku loomist rahuotstarbeliste sõjaliste missioonide läbiviimiseks ning 
ühise militaarkultuuri tekkimist läbi reaalsete ühiste sõjaliste operatsioonide ning -
ühisõppuste EL Lahingugruppide formaadis. Kriitikud on aga rõhutanud probleemseid 
valdkondi, mis puudutavad eelkõige üksuste kättesaadavust, nende varustatust ning 
kriitiliste väevõimete puudujääke, mis on muutnud EL liikmesriikide poolt püstitatud 
eesmärgid sõjalised eesmärgid ebarealistlikuks. Üldistatuna on võimalik väita, et 
                                                          
90 Shepherd, A. J. K. (2003), The European Union's Security and Defence Policy: a policy without 
substance?, European Security, 12:1, 39-63. 
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erinevad liikmesriigid näevad Ühtset Julgeoleku- ka Kaitsepoliitika (ÜJKP) eesmärke 
erinevalt ning puudub üldine poliitiline tahe panna see efektiivselt toimima. Selle 
tulemina on küll olemas võimekus läbi viia väikese mastaabiga sõjalisi missioone, kuid 
nii nende varustatus kui ka mandaat ei toeta piisavalt Ühtse Välis- ja Julgeoleku Poliitika 
eesmärkide täitmist. 
Magistritöö teiseks kandvaks elemendiks on Eur Lex keskkonnas avaldatud erinevate EL 
institutsioonide poolt loodud avalike dokumentide analüüs. Kokku kuulus valimisse 2291 
ÜJKP kaitsevaldkonnaga seotud originaaldokumenti, mida vaadeldi nii dokumente 
loonud EL institutsioonide; dokumendiloome ajalise jaotuse kui ka dokumentides 
kasutatud ametliku terminoloogia alusel.  
Uuringu peamiseks järelmiks on, et muutunud julgeolekukeskkond nii EL sees kui ka 
selle naabruses ei ole avaldanud märkimisväärset mõju dünaamikale EL ametlikus 
dokumendiloomes. Kuigi 2013 aasta viimases kvartalis ja 2014 aastal, mil leidsid aset 
sündmused Krimmis ja Ida-Ukrainas, tekkis dokumentide retoorikasse Ukraina-Venemaa 
suhete ning sanktsioonide temaatika ning mõningal määral kasvas loodud dokumentide 
arv, vähenes valdkonda puudutavate dokumentide arv 2015 aasta jooksul peaaegu oma 
kriisieelsele tasemele. Tervikuna ei näidanud läbiviidud dokumentide analüüs, et ühtse 
kaitse temaatika olulisus oleks kriiside mõjul tõusnud.  
Seesugused tulemused viitavad mitmele võimalikule põhjendusele. Esiteks võib see 
viidata asjaolule, et kuigi deklaratiivselt on liikmesriigid delegeerinud ühiskaitse 
valdkonna EL institutsioonidele, omab valitsuste vaheline infovahetus kriisi korral 
olulisemat rolli, kuid need dokumendid ei kuulu avaldamisele Eur Lex andmebaasis.. 
Alternatiivina on võimalik, et otsitud dünaamika muutus EL dokumentatsioonis on 
tegelikkuses olemas, kuid tegemist on salastusastet omavate dokumentidega, mis ei ole 
Eur Lex keskkonnas nähtavad. 
Võttes aluseks senised arengud ÜJKP raames, erinevate autorite seisukohad ning 
läbiviidud dokumentide uuringu, on võimalik järeldada, et lähiajal ei saa pidada 
märkimisväärset arengut ühiste relvajõudude suunas tõenäoliseks. 
Vaatamata pessimistlikutele järeldustele ÜJKP lähituleviku osas, on magistritöö autori 
hinnangul mõistlik EL avalikku dokumentatsiooni analüüsida ka edaspidi. Aluse selliseks 
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seisukohaks annab EL raames praktiseeritav demokraatia. Nimelt ei ole EL võimalik läbi 
viia selliseid liikmesriikide suveräänsust ja kogu elanikkonda puudutavas küsimuses nagu 
sõjaline kaitse olulisi muudatusi ilma, et see ei oleks saanud laiema toetuse osaliseks EL 
elektoraadilt. Kui see on liikmesriikide ja EL poliitilise eliidi jagatud soov laiendada 
sõjalist koostööd ning läbi selle liikuda ühiste relvajõudude/Euroopa armee suunas, siis 
tuleb see idee riikide kodupublikule „maha müüa“. Kuna tegemist on avalikkuses toimuva 
protsessiga, siis on tõenäoline, et see valdkond leiab senisest suuremas mahus kajastamist 
ka EL ametlikus avalikus dokumentatsioonis. 
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